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Abstract 
There has long been concern over the power of the Canadian Prime Minister, particularly 
their ability to abuse the prerogative power to advise the dissolution, prorogation, or 
summoning of parliament.  To address this problem, this paper argues for a strong 
interpretation of the Crown’s right to refuse advice of First Ministers.  This will be presented 
via Eugene Forsey’s theory of parliamentary government, which conceives of the Governor 
General as the guardian of parliament and responsible government.  Such a conception 
allows us to see how an empowered Governor General could serve as an effective check 
against the potential partisan misuse of the executive’s prerogative powers. 
Résumé 
On s'inquiète depuis longtemps du pouvoir du premier ministre canadien, et en particulier 
l'utilisation abusive de pouvoir dissoudre, proroger ou convoquer le Parlement. Pour 
résoudre cette problématique, ce document plaide en faveur d’une interprétation forte du 
droit de la Couronne de refuser l’avis des premiers ministres. Cela sera présenté via la 
théorie d'Eugene Forsey sur le gouvernement parlementaire, qui présente le gouverneur 
général comme le gardien du Parlement et du gouvernement responsable. Une telle 
conception nous permet de voir comment un gouverneur général habilité pourrait servir de 
contrôle efficace contre la potentielle utilisation abusive partisane des pouvoirs de l’exécutif. 
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Introduction  
Though not a completely new phenomenon, recent years have seen growing concern over 
the centralization of power in the Canadian Prime Minister’s Office.2  Politicians, journalists, 
and academics alike have decried the “elected” or “friendly” dictatorship the office of First 
Minister has become.  The publication of Savoie’s Governing From the Centre in 1999 brought 
the issue to our attention, from which it has never withdrawn.  A common and cross-partisan 
complaint about the state of Canadian politics today is that the Prime Minister has too much 
power and is not sufficiently held accountable to parliament or to the Canadian public for his 
or her actions.  Jeffrey Simpson’s The Friendly Dictatorship (2001) made similar arguments 
in a more accessible format, and Michael Harris’s Party of One (2014), despite its polemical 
style and sanitized history of the pre-Harper years, raises further concerns over the lack of 
accountability of the PM and their inner circle.  Former Green Party leader Elizabeth May has 
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described our system as an “elected dictatorship...a mockery of the foundational principle in 
our system of government of the supremacy of parliament” (Campbell 2013).  She later 
clarified in a 2015 federal leaders debate that her remark was not directed at a single 
political party or Prime Minister, but at our institutions themselves.3  Within the 
Conservative Party, Brent Rathgeber and Michael Chong emerged as two critics of increasing 
centralization.  Rathgeber left the party in protest and described his frustration in 
Irresponsible Government: The Decline of Responsible Government in Canada (Rathgeber 
2014); Chong attempted reform from within, first with his private member’s bill – the 
Reform Act – and eventually by running for party leadership.  Ian Brodie, Stephen Harper’s 
Chief of Staff from 2005 until 2008, has recently pushed back against these concerns, 
highlighting some oft-ignored limitations on prime ministerial power (Brodie 2018). 
Thus, it is clear that prime ministerial abuse of powers and institutions has become an 
object of policy and analytical discussion.  Many of the policy issues currently debated under 
the “democratic reform” moniker can be traced back to this fundamental issue.  This paper 
will address a subset of such proposals, namely those designed to limit the prerogative 
powers of the Prime Minister.  Philippe Lagassé defines prerogative powers as “discretionary 
authorities of the crown that are exercised on the advice of the political executive,” such that 
their exercise does not require parliamentary approval (Lagassé 2017: 167).  Anne Twomey 
likewise describes them as “executive powers which may be exercised by the Sovereign or 
his or her representatives without the need for legislative authorization” (Twomey 2018: 4-
5).  Prerogative powers include the power to prorogue, dissolve, and summon parliament.  
They have been the subject of democratic reform efforts in Westminster states other than 
Canada, and are motivated by the desire to “rebalance the relationship between the 
executive and the legislature” (Lagassé 2017: 168).  This paper will review several proposed 
reforms to prerogative powers in Canada before defending an alternative solution, namely 
upholding the Crown’s right to refuse the advice of First Ministers.  A robust understanding 
of the Crown’s reserve powers, such as that articulated by Eugene Forsey and put into 
practice most recently by British Columbia’s Lieutenant Governor Judith Guichon in 2017, 
will be shown to address the concerns about Prime Ministerial power.  The final section will 
clarify the apparent tension between the power of unelected Governors General and the 
underlying goal of democratic reform. 
Some Recent Proposals 
The following is not meant as an exhaustive account or evaluation of these proposals.  It 
indicates what I take to be their central difficulties, with the qualification that much more 
would need to be said to give these suggestions any finality.  The guiding hypothesis of this 
section is that these reforms will not accomplish what their advocates claim, in large part 
because they are inconsistent with other aspects of Canada’s Westminster parliamentary 
system.  Canada’s parliamentary framework is a whole system, and changing a few parts has 
the potential to cause friction or unintended consequences.  Regarding proposals to relax 
party discipline, Robert Jackson and Paul Conlin write the following: 




Simplistic prescriptions such as the relaxation of party discipline, while seductive, 
fail to take into account the complexity of the parliamentary system.  It is fallacious 
to assume that certain selected features of the congressional system can be 
appended to the parliamentary system without seriously affecting the functioning of 
the entire system (Jackson and Conlin 2002: 231). 
More recently, David E. Smith has argued that most treatments of institutional reform in 
Canada treat individual bodies in isolation from each other rather than treating them as 
bound up in a constitutional whole.  He thinks this is a mistake, and that “in the matter of 
specific institutional reform it is necessary to evaluate the interrelationship of all parts of 
parliament” (Smith 2017: xii).  In another passage he writes that Stephen Harper’s efforts to 
reform the senate failed because they lacked a “coherent theory of the constitution” (Ibid.: 
x).  This paper will not attempt to provide such a coherent theory, but it will examine reform 
proposals in light of the architecture of the Canadian constitution.4  
Fixed Election Dates 
Two recent policy proposals designed to constrain executive prerogative are fixed election 
dates and codified constitutional conventions.  Fixing election dates removes a key partisan 
tool from sitting Prime Ministers, namely the ability to call snap elections when prospects 
for electoral success are at their best.5  However, fixing election dates in a parliamentary 
system is easier said than done.  When a government either loses confidence or is defeated 
before the set date, there is usually no choice but to dissolve parliament and go to the polls.  
Moreover, the 2008 federal election, occurring as it did well in advance of the legislated fixed 
date, proved that even a loss of confidence is not required, so long as the Governor General 
approves the request for dissolution.6  This loophole, which was required in order to avoid 
amending the constitution, rendered the law effectively useless.  It is for this reason that 
Twomey goes so far as to suggest that “in practice, there are no fixed parliamentary terms at 
the national level in Canada” (Twomey 2018: 478). 
It should be noted that Twomey’s claim is not without its critics.  Some observers have 
noted the prevalence, and apparent efficacy, of fixed election date laws at the provincial level 
(Heard 2009).  Moreover, Justin Trudeau respected the fixed election date in October 2019, 
which made it the second federal electoral cycle in which the fixed election date was 
respected.  The difficulties inherent in legally enforcing such laws notwithstanding, it has 
been suggested that setting, and respecting, fixed terms establishes a precedent and thereby 
increases the political cost of calling snap elections (Ferris & Olmstead 2017).  That is, fixed 
election dates are operating somewhere between “the rigidity of a constitutional 
amendment” (Ibid.: 134) and the pure discretion of First Ministers.  It therefore must be 
asked what the possible emergence of a norm concerning fixed-term parliaments means for 
Twomey’s claim – with which I am in agreement – that legislated fixed election dates are 
ineffective. 
The important detail here is that the efficacy of such fixed dates issues not from the force 
of law itself – which we have seen can be flouted – but from the perceived illegitimacy of 
early elections.  If the rule against opportunistic elections is functioning as a precedent or 
norm then we are in the realm traditionally assigned to constitutional conventions.  These 
are upheld politically – that is, by increasing the political cost of violation – rather than 
legally.  About this, two points can be made. 
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First, this is not how fixed election dates are typically construed by their proponents, 
who argue that the force of legislation will prevent First Ministers from doing what would 
otherwise be politically expedient (See for example Aucoin et al. 2011: 218-221).  But if fixed 
dates are operating as conventions, then waiting out the term becomes the politically 
expedient thing to do, insofar as it is done to avoid electoral punishment.  More work should 
be done to sort out the precise nature of the causal logic in effect, but it will suffice for now 
to point out that it may not be the force of legislation itself that is encouraging First Ministers 
to wait out their terms, but the changing calculus resulting from new conventions.  This fact 
should make us reconsider how we understand the claims made on behalf of legislating fixed 
election dates. 
Second, it is worth asking how new of a development this convention is.  Parties have 
been punished for calling early elections long before legislated fixed dates.  Adam Dodek 
notes that there already seems to be a convention regarding the length of terms, and that 
voters have punished past governments for violating it (Dodek 2010: 225).  This convention 
perhaps accounts for the gap between the perceived electoral timing incumbency advantage 
and reality.  Roy and Alcantara (2012) show that the incumbency advantage is limited to 
situations in which the government is receiving positive media coverage.  Schleiter and 
Tavits (2018) find that voters are likely to punish governments perceived to have 
opportunistically called an election; this electoral punishment, however, can be outweighed 
by strong economic performance.  So although there can be an advantage to be gained from 
calling an election during a period of positive press coverage or strong economic 
performance, there does seem to be a real political cost associated with opportunism, even 
before the fixed election date law came into effect.  This gives weight to Dodek’s claim that 
there is a convention against elections outside a specific temporal window (Dodek 2010: 
225).  The effect of fixed date legislation, absent a constitutional amendment limiting the 
power of the Governor General, seems therefore to be fairly minimal.  Any effect it has is 
arguably a function of its strengthening of the conventions surrounding election timing 
rather than the direct force of the law itself. Moreover, strengthening the law via 
constitutional change may very well introduce new problems of its own.  Prohibiting the 
Governor General from dissolving parliament until a particular date raises the possibility of 
deadlocked or moribund legislatures in which no party or coalition is able to form 
government.  It seems that there must be at least some situations in which the Governor 
General has the ability to dissolve parliament.  These difficulties were noted in Bill C-16’s 
legislative summary itself.  The first of eight disadvantages raised by opponents of the bill 
was that “fixed terms are inconsistent with a parliamentary form of government, in which 
the executive must retain the confidence of the legislature” (Canada 2007: 10).  The sixth 
disadvantage likewise calls into question the compatibility of fixed election dates with 
parliamentary government, reminding the reader that it is not governments that are elected, 
but members of parliament.  Much of the desire for fixed election dates, the legislative 
summary suggests, comes from the widespread misunderstanding that Canadians elect 
governments, not parliaments (Canada 2007: 11).  
Governments require the confidence of the House of Commons, and when confidence is 
either lost or unattainable in the first place, dissolution and new elections are a legitimate 
and sometimes necessary procedure in Westminster systems (Forsey 1974: 152-156; 
Twomey 2018: 460).  A law that truly prevented Governors General from dissolving 
parliament until a four-year term ended might easily lead to political deadlock.  Twomey 




notes that a fixed election law with teeth, such as those in the UK and some Australian states, 
has the potential to increase, rather than decrease, the risk of political instability, contrary 
to expectations (Twomey 2018: 479-480). 
Moreover, scholars point to yet another unintended consequence of fixed parliamentary 
terms, namely the prolongation of campaigns, beginning long before the writ period.  Though 
not the only factor in this recent development, fixed election dates have been said to 
incentivize “pre-campaign electioneering” (Marland 2015: 24).  Lagassé cautions against 
overly-simplistic understandings of the causal relationship but notes that fixed election 
dates have “amplified” the permanent campaign (Lagassé 2017: 167).  The logic behind this 
is easy to see, especially when we consider that pre-writ advertising is not uniformly or even 
universally regulated in Canada.  As recently as 2016, there were no federal restrictions on 
pre-writ advertising at the federal level or in five of the provinces (Marland 2015: 16).7  A 
fixed election date, no matter how far in the future, provides a shared time frame within 
which all parties can prepare platforms, initiate advertising strategies, and commence other 
campaign activities (Lagassé 2017: 176). 
Lagassé also argues that fixed election dates lead to earlier election speculation in the 
media, which is “arguably the legislation’s strongest contribution to permanent 
campaigning” (Ibid.: 175).  With an eye to the future of fixed election dates and the 
permanent campaign, he suggests that if a norm develops with respect to the four year fixed 
terms, the speculation effect might recede, though it would not “diminish the elongation of 
the campaign preparation period” that fixed terms have encouraged (Lagassé 2017: 178). 
Nothing that has been written so far implies that First Ministers have not abused their 
prerogative to request dissolution; indeed this is demonstrably a tactic for which multiple 
parties are to blame.8  Rather, the question is whether it is possible or desirable to fix election 
dates within a parliamentary system.  The foregoing suggests that fixed election dates have 
an uneasy, at best, relationship with parliamentary responsible government such that they 
either are impossible to effectively implement or will lead to parliamentary paralysis and 
unreasonably long campaign periods.  If we wish to prevent First Ministers from abusing 
their prerogative powers then it seems that we must look to other policy or institutional 
changes 
Codified Conventions 
Another response to the abuse of the prerogative powers has been an emerging literature on 
codifying constitutional conventions.  Aucoin, Jarvis, and Turnbull (2011) provide a 
systematic defense of this proposal, though this idea has longstanding historical roots (Evatt 
1936).  Proponents of this idea suggest that the problem comes from the nature of unwritten 
conventions themselves.  Lack of clarity regarding what exactly is permitted combined with 
partisan interest in manipulating the rules for partisan gain have allowed Prime Ministers to 
abuse their power, and neither the Governor General nor the House of Commons have 
proved able to provide an effective check (Ibid.: 57; See also Russell 2012).  The thrust of 
many of their reforms is to enshrine in writing much of what is currently unwritten and 
therefore open to abuse, either through constitutional reform itself or a Cabinet manual in 
the style of New Zealand.9 
This approach avoids the problems associated with fixed election dates while remaining 
attuned to the easily-abused powers of proroguing, dissolving, or summoning parliament.10  
The authors are certainly correct in their claims that as things stand it is too easy for a Prime 
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Minister to abuse these powers.  Counting on electoral constraints alone to generate 
compliance with conventions has proved insufficient. 
Proponents of codification argue that it will reduce the uncertainty surrounding the 
meaning and application of conventions, while preventing their arbitrary application and 
partisan abuse.  Here too, however, there is a risk of unintended consequences.  The 
unwritten nature of conventions provides them with a helpful elasticity or flexibility which 
will be lost if they are written down (Twomey 2017: 41).  Moreover, if the conventions are 
enshrined as statutory or constitutional law, they become a matter for the courts and hence 
become legally enforceable, or “justiciable” (Twomey 2017: 39-41; Bowden & MacDonald 
2012).  This would constitute a legal encroachment on the Crown’s prerogative and possibly 
even threaten responsible government itself (Bowden & MacDonald 2012: 372).  An 
additional consequence of conventions’ justiciability is the potential for protracted legal 
battles or constitutional crises, where immediate discretionary action could otherwise put 
an end to potentially volatile or unstable situations.  Since conventions are meant to solve 
political, not legal, crises, they are ill-suited to enshrinement and justiciability (Twomey 
2017: 39-41).  Twomey’s final conclusion concerning codified conventions is that the very 
uncertainty of conventions, which proponents of codification seek to do away with, is 
actually the source of their power.  She suggests that reserve powers are most effective when 
they are not used, but may be; it follows that the possibility that they may be utilized at any 
given time acts as a constant check on the behavior of First Ministers (Ibid.: 42-43). 
The principle upon which codified conventions rests is incompatible with Westminster 
government.  Westminster government is built around the principles of flexibility, ambiguity, 
and sovereign discretion, albeit balanced by the requirement to maintain the confidence of 
an elected chamber (MacKinnon 1976: 166; Mallory 1984: 2; Smith 2013: xv; Smith 2017: 
19, 136).  Codification is meant to eliminate the need for discretion as much as possible.  
Eliminating the need for discretion while retaining the constitutional framework of 
responsible government leads to the following paradoxical effects.  Conventions, now 
written and hence harder to change, cease to develop organically along with Canadian 
society and political culture.  Changing conventions into written laws constitutes a judicial 
encroachment on the Crown-in-Parliament, insofar as the prerogative powers of dissolution, 
summoning, and proroguing of parliament, which have thus far been held in check by 
politically-enforceable conventions, are now answerable to the courts.  Finally, the ability of 
the Governor General to act decisively in times of crisis will be hampered by the need to wait 
for the legal system to deliver a judgement before action can be taken.  Without downplaying 
the possibility of abuse, with which Aucoin et al. are rightly concerned, these possible flaws 
must be considered.  On balance, we can say that codifying constitutional conventions, while 
promising to limit the partisan use of prerogative, would actually bring about important 
changes in the constitutional structure of Canada in ways that fundamentally alter the 
practice of responsible government. 
The above discussion has highlighted some of the ways in which calls for fixed election dates 
and codified conventions, while originating from legitimate concerns, fail to take into 
account the way in which Westminster systems work as organic wholes in which each part 
must be consistent with the rest.  Fixed election dates are incompatible with the House of 
Commons’ role as a confidence chamber and are only institutionally appropriate in 
presidential systems (Forsey 1974: 27-28).  An essential feature of Westminster government 
is that elections are required when the government loses confidence and no one else can 




garner the confidence of parliament.  As long as responsible government is retained, and 
with it the requirement that the government maintain the confidence of the House, elections 
can never be truly fixed.  Another important feature of Westminster government is that it 
operates according to politically-enforced conventions.  The effects of codifying them has 
been discussed above, but suffice it to say again that legal codification makes conventions a 
matter for the courts and removes their capacity for adaption and adjustment to changing 
Canadian society.  It would thus appear that such proposals lack what Smith refers to as “a 
coherent theory of the constitution” (Smith 2017: x). 
The Classic Theory of Parliamentary Government 
My proposal shares with the previous two the goal of limiting First Ministers’ ability to abuse 
their prerogative powers for partisan purposes.  The aspect of Prime Ministerial power it 
addresses is the ability to dissolve, prorogue, and summon the House of Commons at will, 
because this gets to the heart of what it means for a government to be responsible to 
parliament.  However, it differs markedly from them in important ways.  First, it preserves 
the discretionary principle of Westminster government, and as such keeps our conventions 
and election dates uncodified and open to the requirements of changing political situations.  
Second, it rejects the claim made by some authors discussed above that granting more 
authority to Governors General is inherently undemocratic.  For example, as part of their 
argument for codified conventions Aucoin et al. assert that the democratic nature of the 
Canadian political system is incompatible with unelected Governors General having 
decision-making powers over important matters:  
The claim that the Governor General has discretion – albeit limited by convention – 
hardly supports the understanding of responsible government as a structure with 
democratic constitutional constraints on the Prime Minister and Government 
(Aucoin et al. 2011: 59-60).  
Arguments for fixed election dates similarly refer to the increased prospects for 
democracy that will result from taking election timing out of the hands of Prime Ministers or 
Governors General (Leuprecht and McHugh 2008; Canada 2007: 10).  On the contrary, an 
important aspect of the following proposal is that the ability of unelected Governors General 
to refuse cabinet advice, when appropriate, actually upholds Canadian democracy. 
Third, the above solutions all involve additions or reforms to our parliamentary 
structure.  However, there is a tradition of scholarly reflection according to which our 
constitution already contains the tools required to constrain executive abuse.  For 
simplicity’s sake, I will refer to it using Eugene Forsey’s term, the Classic Theory of 
Parliamentary Government, since the primary goal is a return to an earlier understanding of 
the constitution.  The work of Forsey will be discussed in order to demonstrate how this 
theory understands the problem of Prime Ministerial abuse and what its solution to it is. 11 
In brief, the Classic Theory of Parliamentary Government offers a robust interpretation 
of the reserve powers of the Crown, specifically the power to refuse Cabinet advice.  This is 
particularly relevant in the wake of BC Lieutenant-Governor Judith Guichon’s denial of 
Christy Clark’s request for dissolution in June 2017.  The weaker interpretation of these 
powers, what Forsey calls the rubber stamp theory of the constitution (Forsey 1974: 30, 34, 
87), asserts that representatives of the Crown must accept any and all advice of First 
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Ministers.  Since 1926 this has been the dominant view in Canada, so much so that the 
possibility of Guichon refusing Clark’s advice was recently referred to as a constitutional 
crisis (Morcos 2017; Hunter 2018; for the opposing view see Heard 2017).   
Eugene Forsey v. the Rubber Stamp Theory 
A full elaboration of Forsey’s constitutional theory is not possible in this paper, but the 
following principles were central to his scholarship and bear heavily on his theory of reserve 
powers: 
1. The Crown as guardian of the constitution 
2. The importance of parliament 
3. The insufficiency of majoritarianism alone as a guide for governance12 
These principles are in fact different elements of what Forsey calls “the classic theory of 
parliamentary government” (Forsey 1974: 98), namely that cabinet must be responsible to 
parliament.  Any attempt to undermine or minimize parliament’s role of giving or 
withholding confidence from governments is unconstitutional and amounts to an 
unacceptable increase of prime ministerial power.  This can even be the case, Forsey argued, 
with appeals to the electorate, when it is appealed to in order to escape the judgement of 
parliament.  This is where the reserve power of the Governor General is required, he claimed, 
specifically to refuse such requests for dissolution.13  This is not simply an imperial or elitist 
intrusion into democratic politics, he insisted, but the constitutional mechanism by which 
responsible and parliamentary government is upheld.  It is in this sense that the Crown – and 
by extension the Governor General as representative of the Crown in Canada – is the 
guardian of the constitution.  The centrality of parliament to the functioning of responsible 
government is, for Forsey, the determining factor in questions concerning the meaning and 
weight of constitutional conventions, and in particular the reserve power to refuse 
dissolution (Forsey 1968: 257). 
Forsey’s response to the “rubber stamp” theory is most clearly articulated in a short 
essay entitled “The Crown and the Constitution,” first published in 1953.  It begins by relating 
two arguments against the Crown’s power to refuse Cabinet advice: “Many people will object 
that there is no reserve power; that the Crown is just a rubber stamp for the Cabinet, or that 
if it isn’t it ought to be” (Forsey 1974: 34). 
Against the first objection Forsey replies that there obviously is such a power because it 
has been exercised in the past.  He could point to over 50 such cases of denied requests; the 
only post-Confederation Canadian case was the infamous King-Byng affair of 1926, though 
there were six pre-confederation refusals between 1858 and 1903 (Ibid.: 34-35; see Forsey 
1968 for an extended analysis of the King-Byng affair).  We can now add the 2017 British 
Columbia case.  In other writings Forsey supported the historical precedents with the 
opinions of leading constitutional scholars.  For example, his 35-page review of 
“constitutional authorities” in The Royal Power of Dissolution of Parliament in the British 
Commonwealth led him to the conclusion that “[t]he consensus of opinion among the 
authorities seems clearly to be that in the United Kingdom the Crown has some discretion to 
refuse dissolution” (Forsey 1968: 106).  The question is not whether there is such a reserve 
power, but only how far it extends and in which circumstances it may legitimately be used. 




The response to the second, normative, objection is more instructive for the present 
argument.  If his first argument could be called the argument from precedence, his second 
can be called the argument from parliamentary or democratic integrity.14  It is important to 
stress that the effect of strong reserve powers is the integrity of our democratic institutions; 
more about this will be said later. 
Forsey illustrates the usefulness of the Crown’s right to refuse in a number of situations, 
in each of which advising dissolution can be used for partisan purposes and to avoid 
responsibility to parliament, such responsibility being the cornerstone of Westminster 
government.  Two such situations are worth exploring here since, even though Forsey 
intended them as thought experiments, they bear noteworthy similarities to recent Canadian 
experience.  He raises the possibility of a Prime Minister, upon winning a plurality of seats in 
a general election and being defeated by the other parties, requesting dissolution and a new 
election rather than allowing another party to form government.  Suppose the second 
election produces a similar result, and another dissolution is requested, and so on.  “Is the 
Governor-General,” Forsey rhetorically asks, “bound to acquiesce in the game of 
constitutional ping-pong from electorate to parliament, from parliament to electorate again, 
back and forth interminably” (Forsey 1974: 40)?  The effect of this would be to give a Prime 
Minister the unfair advantage of being able to appeal to either Parliament or the electorate, 
based on whichever group he thinks has the best chance of supporting him.  Doing so fails to 
hold Cabinet responsible to parliament by giving it the option of another judge when 
preferred; it is a “‘heads I win, tails you lose’ theory of the constitution....[that] bears not the 
faintest resemblance to Parliamentary government” (Ibid.: 41). 
This is a plausible explanation of Christy Clark’s actions following the 2017 BC provincial 
election.  After winning a slim plurality of seats and being defeated in the legislature by the 
Greens and NDP, she advised another dissolution.  Her advice was refused, and there is no 
telling what would have happened if a second election resulted in another slim minority, but 
suffice to say that Forsey’s example was sufficiently realistic, in particular the possibility of 
appealing to either the legislature or the voters whenever convenient. 
In another hypothetical situation, Forsey supposes that a government facing criticism 
and a vote of non-confidence might request a dissolution before the parliamentary vote can 
be taken.  In so doing, the ability of parliament to judge a government and possibly withhold 
confidence is denied.  However, according to the rubber stamp theory, such a dissolution 
would have to be granted; this leads to Forsey’s judgement that the rubber stamp theory 
enables a Cabinet to defy both Parliament and the electors (Ibid.: 43). 
This situation is similar to Stephen Harper’s requested prorogation in 2008.15  Fearing 
defeat by an upcoming non-confidence motion supported by the opposition parties, Harper 
asked for and received a prorogation in order to convince the public of the illegitimacy of 
coalition governments before allowing the motion to come to a vote.  This strategy has the 
same “heads I win, tails you lose” quality as Forsey’s example.  If Harper was unable to 
prevent the House of Commons from removing confidence, he would simply end the session 
before it had a chance to formally do so, such that the extent of his responsibility to 
Parliament was limited.16 
Forsey’s conclusion from these thought experiments – though we have seen that they 
resemble real situations – is that the rubber stamp theory, by placing inordinate power in 
the Prime Minister to dictate how and even whether the House of Commons is able to hold 
them responsible, reduces rather than increases the level of our democracy.  An “appeal to 
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the people,” he writes, “is not necessarily democratic.  It may be merely demagogic, pseudo-
democratic, or even anti-democratic” (Forsey 1974: 44).  It naturally follows that “[t]he 
reserve power is, indeed, under our constitution, an absolutely essential safeguard of our 
democracy” (Forsey 1974: 48).  Similar statements can be found throughout his 
constitutional writings (Ibid.: 30, 98). 
 We can further elucidate Forsey’s position.  First Ministers sometimes offer advice 
that has the effect of limiting the ability of Parliament to hold the government to account.  
Alternatively, they can offer advice when they do not have the constitutional authority to do 
so, such as making Governor-in-Council appointments immediately after losing an election.  
Doing so, in Forsey’s words, has the effect of “setting the verdict of the electorate at defiance” 
(Forsey 1974: 38). 
When advice of either type is given, the way to uphold parliamentary government is to 
deny such requests (Forsey 1974: 30, 40, 43; Forsey 1968: 257-259).  Bearing in mind that 
the democratic element of Westminster systems consists in the government being held 
responsible to Parliament rather than in control of it, any advice that has the effect of limiting 
Parliament’s ability to hold the government to account can be said to minimize the 
democratic constraints on executive power (Ibid.: 258).  The corollary is that insofar as the 
reserve power protects Parliament’s ability to hold the executive branch to account it is an 
important component of our democracy (Forsey 1974: 48). 
The result of the weakened conception of the Governor General’s reserve power to refuse 
cabinet advice has been to fundamentally alter the balance of power between parliament and 
the Prime Minister.  When, as Forsey says, the PM “always has a dissolution in its pocket” 
(Forsey 1968: 258; 1974: 44), he or she can hang the threat of an election over the heads of 
individual members.  Without automatic recourse to a dissolution, the government’s 
inability to maintain parliamentary support might either mean dissolution – i.e. parliament 
ends – or their resignation – i.e. the life of the government ends but parliament continues.  
Presently, however, the inability to maintain confidence simply entails dissolution.  That is 
to say that a loss of confidence is more of a threat to parliament than to the government.  It 
is for this reason that Forsey writes that the rubber stamp theory allows the Prime Minister 
to “put himself above both” the electorate and parliament (Forsey 1974: 105).  In other 
words, it gives the Prime Minister an alternative to securing support in parliament, which in 
turn reduces their incentive to work with the parliament that has been elected by voters.  
The difficulty that the House of Commons will have in holding such governments responsible 
is manifest. 
The seeming paradox of this solution is that an unelected official is being counted on to 
preserve the power of parliament and empower our elected representatives.  To close it may 
be helpful to frame this solution in a way that reconciles its apparent undemocratic quality 
with the goal of democratic reform. 
Liberal Democratic Reform of Parliamentary Government 
This proposal includes the counter-intuitive claim that appealing to the electorate is not 
necessarily democratic.  The link between electoral democracy and good governance has 
been challenged in recent years (Brennan 2016; Achen and Bartels 2016; Mounk 2018).  
More specifically, Fareed Zakaria has clarified the relationship between elections and what 
is distinctly “liberal” in our conception of democracy.  He suggests that liberal democracy 




includes the two distinct conceptions of “constitutional liberalism” and electoral 
representation, and further argues that it is really the former that is essential to healthy 
politics, even when the latter is not present (Zakaria 2003).  This accords with the common 
sense observation that majorities can support just or unjust, liberal or illiberal policies and 
politicians.17  His formulation has particular relevance to the topic of reserve powers on 
account of his favourable description of Westminster government as “liberal autocracy” 
(Ibid.: 20, 57).  His point is similar to Forsey’s distinction between parliamentary responsible 
government and mere plebiscitary majoritarianism.  Zakaria’s formulation and Forsey’s 
constitutional theory share the assumption that the mere counting of heads does not a 
functioning democracy make. 
If this is true, then what we usually refer to simply as Democratic Reform should more 
properly be called Liberal Democratic Reform.  Conceiving of the project in this way clarifies 
the goal; it is not simply increased voter input, per se, but the goods associated with 
constitutional liberalism including the rule of law and checks on executive overreach.  
Though turning down requests by First Ministers does not easily fit the minimalist 
conception of democratic reform, insofar as it places important decisions in the hands of an 
unelected Governor General, it does fit nicely within the broader conception of liberal 
democratic reform, insofar as it strengthens parliament’s ability to hold the executive to 
account.  Removing the option of conveniently timed prorogations and dissolutions tilts the 
balance of power in the direction of the House of Commons.  This would not only strengthen 
the constitutional liberal aspect of our politics but would also help to restore the proper 
balance between responsiveness to voters and Cabinet’s direct responsibility to parliament. 
An important principle in Forsey’s political thought is that democracy cannot be reduced 
to simple majoritarianism or endless plebiscites (Forsey 1968: 257; 1974: 43-44, 98).  In 
practice this means that the House of Commons, not the electorate itself, is the check on 
government.  The democratic element of Canadian politics is to be found in the elected lower 
house deciding who forms government; it is not, nor was it ever meant to be, found in 
plebiscites or constant appeals to the people.  Through his writings Forsey demonstrates 
how allowing First Ministers to appeal to the people at will in fact increases their power 
instead of empowering the voters. 
Given the constitutional architecture of Canada’s Westminster system, the proper way 
to limit the improper use of the prerogative powers is to hang over the head of First Ministers 
the threat that any advice not in accord with the principles of responsible government is 
open to refusal.  In other words, the Governor General, as guardian of the constitution, needs 
to be able to act in order to uphold the democratic element of our political system.  
Furthermore, in the context of the first section of this paper, the traditional conception of the 
reserve powers does not introduce foreign elements into parliamentary government and as 
such avoids such problems as those introduced by fixed election dates and codified 
conventions.  Allowing the Crown to refuse advice that restricts parliament’s ability to 
perform its constitutional role is consistent with Westminster government, unlike other 
proposals that might be more at home in presidential systems. 
  




1 This paper was one of the two recipients of the Marjorie Griffin Cohen Award for the best two papers 
presented to the BCPSA 2019 held May 3-4 at Langara College / snəw̓eyəɬ leləm̓, Vancouver, BC, 
2019.   
2 The author would like to thank Alex Marland, David E. Smith, and Andrew Heard for their helpful 
comments on early versions of this paper. 
3 This occurred during the Macleans Magazine hosted debate on August 6th, 2015.  The transcript is 
available in “Tale of the tape: Read a full transcript of Maclean’s Debate,” (2015, August 7). 
Macleans. Retrieved from https://www.macleans.ca/politics/ottawa/tale-of-the-tape-read-a-full-
transcript-of-macleans-debate/. 
4 The phrase “constitutional architecture” was used by the Supreme Court of Canada.  Reference re 
Senate Reform, 2014 SCC 32. 
5 There is limited consensus on the extent of the incumbent advantage, though there seems to be at 
least some benefit in being able to determine the timing of elections (Ferris & Olmstead 2017; 
Dickson, Farnsworth & Zhang 2013; Roy & Alcantara 2012; Leuprecht and McHugh 2008).  
Peter H. Russell argues in favour of fixed election dates’ ability to cut back on snap elections 
(Russell 2008: 134-142).  Aucoin, Jarvis, and Turnbull offer a more sceptical account (Aucoin et al. 
2011: 130-132, 218-221).  See also the Legislative Summary for Bill C-16 for a summary of main 
arguments both for and against fixed election dates (Canada 2007).  
6 See Lagassé (2017: 173-174) for a discussion of Stephen Harper and Rob Nicholson’s justification 
for advising dissolution without losing the confidence of the House of Commons.  Also Aucoin et al. 
(2011: 62-65). 
7 Federal and provincial governments have since begun to close this loophole.  Since 2016, federal 
pre-writ “partisan advertising” has been restricted to roughly $1.5 million (Government of Canada 
2018), and PEI has limited pre-writ campaign activities (Election Expenses Act, RSPEI 2018). 
8 Aucoin et al. point out that John Diefenbaker, Lester B. Pearson, Pierre Trudeau, Jean Chretien, and 
Stephen Harper all called snap elections for partisan advantage (2011: 207). 
9 Bowden and MacDonald correctly note the difference between legal-constitutional codification and 
less binding cabinet manuals (2012: 366).  The present argument is primarily concerned with legal-
constitutional codification.  A less binding manual or guide to the various conventions is not 
necessarily inconsistent with a strong conception of the reserve powers of the Crown, so I will not 
address it in this paper. 
10 Aucoin et al. do raise the prospect of fixed election dates but recognize the difficulty in formulating 
such a law that would be impervious to abuse (Aucoin et al. 2011: 218-221, 225-226). 
11 Forsey is often recognized as an authority on constitutional matters (MacKinnon 1976: 39; Smith 
2017: 130), though to date there have been remarkably few scholarly works devoted to 
systematically interpreting or applying his constitutional thought.  The only two book-length 
treatments of Forsey are Helen Forsey’s Eugene Forsey: Canada’s Maverick Sage (2012) and Frank 
Milligan’s Eugene A. Forsey: An Intellectual Biography (2004).  Of the two, Helen Forsey provides 
the more comprehensive analysis of Forsey’s constitutional thought.  In fact, it could be argued that 
the single chapter Milligan devotes to Forsey’s constitutional theory misrepresents its subject 
matter.  For example, Milligan writes that Forsey affirmed the principle that “the power and rights 
of the people [must be protected] against the partial, particular interest of the governments or 
majority parties” (Milligan 2004: 207).  This principle is taken, in Milligan’s account, to justify the 
reserve power to refuse dissolution.  However, this ignores, or at least downplays, the crucial 
element of Forsey’s position, which requires distinguishing between the electorate and parliament.  
It is precisely Forsey’s claim that appeal to “the people” is not always justified.  Forsey’s position is 
that it is not enough the say appealing to parliament is important because it represents the 





democratic principle in Canadian politics. If that were the sole important fact about parliament then 
there would be no reason to oppose rubber-stamp granting of appeals to the people themselves.  
But parliament itself has an indispensable role in our system, over and above the mere fact that it 
happens to be the democratic element.  Appealing to the people – though more democratic in a 
limited sense – actually weakens the parliamentary check on prime ministerial power. 
To fully account for this dynamic, we must distinguish between parliament and the people in a 
clearer fashion than Milligan does.  Helen Forsey does just that, for example by specifying the 
importance of Parliament itself as being one of Forsey’s fundamental constitutional principles 
(Forsey 2012: 309). 
12 Eugene Forsey’s daughter, Helen Forsey, distills his constitutional thought down to five principles, 
on which my list is based (Forsey 2012: ch. 12).  I have limited my list to those principles concerned 
with the reserve powers of the Crown, and hence have left off some of hers, like Federalism.  This 
does not imply, however, any disagreement with Helen Forsey’s list.  
13 Most of Forsey’s published work discusses instances in which the Governor General is permitted 
to refuse dissolution.  However, an unpublished paper on the powers of the Governor General 
written in 1984 refers to prorogation alongside dissolution, without changing any other elements 
of the argument (quoted in Forsey 2012: 318).  For that reason, it is perhaps fair to assume that 
Forsey believed that his arguments for refusing dissolution could apply to prorogation as well. 
14 Both arguments are integral to Forsey’s defense of reserve powers.  He argues that precedent alone 
is an insufficient guide to constitutional conventions, for the simple reason that at one point in time 
everything was unprecedented.  We must therefore, he suggested, refer also to the spirit and 
intention of the constitution (Forsey 1968: 6-8, 72; Forsey 2012: 334; Milligan 2004: 206-207). 
15 Aucoin et al. provide a helpful and concise summary of these events (2011: 65-68). 
16 See Helen Forsey (2008) for an application of Eugene Forsey’s critique of the rubber stamp theory 
to the events of December 2008. 
17 Yascha Mounk has more recently made the same conceptual distinction between “rights” and 
“democracy” (Mounk 2018).  
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